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Daniel Blinka
ast June 1993 the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals. 1 The
Court's decision concerns the
evidentiary standards governing the admissibili ty of expert
scientific evidence. Daubert changed the
law in the Seventh Circuit and raises
serious questions about the test presently
applied in Wisconsin state courts.
Daubert touches potentially the entire
spectrum of expert evidence. Civil litigation and , to a lesser extent, criminal trials
frequently feature one or more experts
testifying on a variety of topics, often in
opposition to one another. Credit or
blame for the flowering of expert testimony often is attributed to the Federal
Rules ofEvidence (FRE), which has been
adopted in varying forms in nearly 40
states, including Wisconsin, over the last
20 years.
The use of expert witnesses invites
issues about the admissibility of their
testimony. Although most jurisdictions
follow some version of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, state couns and federal circuits failed to achieve any consensus on
how the rules regulate the admissibility
of expert evidence. The failure was all
the more remarkable because the courts
were by and large dealing with identically worded rules.
Daniel Blinka, U. W. 1978, is an associate
professor of law DW Marquette University
Law School where he teaches courses in
evidence and crimina/law. He is the
author of 8/inka, Wisconsin Practice:
Evidence (West Publishing, 1991) (and
supplementation).
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Daubert,_ Merrell Dow
PharPDFHXWLFDOVchanges
the law of evidence In the
Seventh Circuit
and fosters a host of new
questions In state courts.
In 1984 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
resolved all uncertainties regarding the
test governing the adm issibi li ty of expert
evidence in Wisconsin. In State v.
WalstaG2 the court confirmed that Wisconsin adheres to a relevancy standard: if
a properly qualified expert is able to offer
testimony relevant and helpful to the issues in the case, his or her testimony is
admissible. Walstad further clarified that
the so-called Frye test of general acceptance within the scientific community
was not a prerequisite to admissibility,
even though it remained a viable standard
for the taking of judicial notice.3
The certainty engendered by Walstad
stood in marked contrast to the chaos in
the federal court , where the circuits
warred over the correct standard. A majority of the circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, maintained that the Frye test
survived the advent of the Federal Rules
ofEvidence.4 Other circuits opted for the
relevancy approach (like Wisconsin's)
orthe somewhat more demanding" Downing test," first articulated by the Third
Circuit and representing a hybridi zation
of the relevancy and general acceptance
approaches.5
On June 28, 1993, the U.S. Supreme
Court finally entered the fray in Daubert.

The Court quickly and efficiently assigned the Frye test to obli vion as the sole
criterion of admissibility. Instead, it offered a host of "general observations"
that inevitably will lead to a reassessment
of the general relevancy test set forth in
Walstad.
Daubert is significant for the Wi sconsin lawyer because it changed the law of
evidence in the Seventh Circuit and will
foster a myriad of new questions in state
courts. This article reviews the Daubert
decision and explains how it invites a
reappraisal of Walstad.

The Daubert case

The plaintiffs in Daubert were two children born with birth defects. The children alleged that their injuries were caused
by their mother's ingestion during pregnancy ofBendectin70,an anti-nausea drug
manufactured by the defendant, Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals. The defendant
moved for summary judgment on the
ground that there was insufficient proof
that Bendectin was a teratogen (a substancecausingabnormalities). Both sides
presented conflicting cientific evidence
from experts bearing impressive credentials. Plaintiffs' scientific evidence featured animal-cell studies, "live-animal
studies" and the "reanalysis" of epidemiological (statistical) data prepared in
connection with other studies.
The trial court granted the summary
judgment motion. The district court ruled
that the reanalysis evidence failed to meet
the general acceptance (Frye) test and
that the remaining scientific evidence
was insufficient to raise a jury question
on causation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
WISCONSIN LAWYER

The U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision
written by Justice' Blackrnun, reversed
and ordered the matter remanded for further proceedings. ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in
part and dissented in part.
The Court held unanimously that "the
Frye test was superseded by the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence."' The
entire Court agreed that the "baseline"
for admissibility is found in the relevancy
rules of FRE 40 I and 402, which are
identical to their Wisconsin counterparts.
Moreover, the rules articulate a liberal
standard of relevancy .7 The admissibility

of scientific evidence is, however, also

governed by FRE 702, which allows expert witnesses to testify about scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact in deter-

mining a fact in issue. Nothing in the

language of FRE 702 or its drafting history suggested that the rule incorporated
the Frye test. Although the Court unanimously agreed that Frye did not control
the admissibility of scientific evidence
under the federal rules, the justices parted
company on the precise interplay of the
rules.

The Daubert criteria for
admissibility

The majority of the Court offered some

general observatiRnV on the admissibility

of scientific evidence. These remarks,
which comprise the bulk of Justice
Blackmon's opinion, were addressed specifically to trial judges faced with the
bewildering task of mediating conflicts
between experts on highly specialized or
abstruse subjects.
The Court acknowledged the liberal
orientation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but cautioned that the rules stRp
short of granting carte blanche to expert
testimony. Specifically, trialjudges must
screen expert testimony: "the trial judge
must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not
only relevant, but reliable." 8 Rule 702
"clearly contemplates some degree of
regulation of the subject and theories
about which an expert may testify. " 9
With pedantic precision, Justice
Blackmun parsed the subtle meanings
inherent in the phrase "scientific knowledge." He explained that the reliability or
trustworthiness of scientific knowledge
depended upon the fealty of the theory or
technique to the scientific method, which
involves repeated testing and refinement
as a way of establishing the validity of the
procedure or idea. Moreover, Rule 702
provides that expert evidence is admissible only where it will assist the trier of
i2

fact. And in assessing the helpfulness of
the evidence, the trial judge must determine the fit between the expert evidence
and the facts of the case.
In short, scientific validity ultimately
turns on the purpose for which the evidence is offered. Justice Blackrnun offered as an example evidence concerning
the phases of the moon. The existence of
a full moon may help a jury decide how
dark it was on a given night, but lunar
phases have no bearing on a person's
irrational behavior on that same evening.
Without seeing any paradox in its asV X P S W L R Q V a  the majority of the Court cautioned that expert testimony must be restricted because of the wide latitude allowed experts under the federal rules.
Experts are freed from 'the traditional
requirement that opinions be predicated
upon first-hand knowledge. Unlike a lay
witness, ari expert can predicate an opinion on inadmissible hearsay under Rule
703. Relaxation ofthefirst-hancl knowledge rule is justified only where the
expert's opinion has "a reliable basis in
the knowledge and experience of his discipline."10
Thus, the trial judge must make "a
preliminary assessmeQW of whether the
reasoning or methode Iogy under! y ing the
testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning can be applied to
the facts in issue." 11 The judge's determination is governed by Rule 104(a), meaning that the rules of evidence generally
are inapplicable to the issue of admissibility and the judge must be convinced of
the validity and fit of the proffered scientific testimony by a preponderance of the
evidence. To assist the trial judges in this'
task, the Court offered a number of general observations without presuming to
set forth a definitive checklist or test.
None of the factors outlined by the Court
were extensively discussed or explained.
First, a key question is whether the
theory or technique has been tested. The
Court referred to several authorities that
discussed the importance of rigorously
testing theories or techniques to determine whether they can be falsified. 12
The second consideration is whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.
TheCourtexplained that publication was
a relevant factor but the presence or absence of publication was not dispositive
in assessing scientific validity. Justice
Blackmun observed that some techniques
or theories "are too particular, too new, or
of too limited interest to be published,"
thus suggesting that the trial court should
consider the reasons why there was no
publication. 13

Third, the trial court must consider the
scientific technique's "known or potential rate of error ... and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation." The reference to
standards would seem to refer to the
existence of established protocols or published methodologies. No indication was
given of what, if any, statistical criteria
establisheli an acceptable rate of error. 14
Fourth, the general acceptance of a
theory or technique is an important, although not controlling, factor. Justice
Blackmun observed: "Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in
ruling particularevidence admissible, and
'a known technique that has been able to
attract only minimal support within the
community' ... may properly be viewed
with skepticism."
In short, the Court demoted the Frye
test in the evidentiary pantheon but it
would be a mistake to dismiss the general
acceptance test as dead orQo longer worth
worrying about.

Daubert's impact on Wisconsin

Wisconsin's relevancy approach shares
critical common ground with the Daubert
approach. Both Walstad and Daubert
agree that relevancy is the baseline of
admissibility. Moreover, both cases reflect an abiding faith in the adversary
system and the abilities of jurors. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Walstad
observed that the critical considerations
for admissibility are the expert's qualifications and the relevancy of the testimony; weaknesses in the expert's testimony may be brought out on cross-examination or through impeachment.
Echoing similar themes, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert reaffirmed its
belief that lay jurors, assisted by the adversary system, would not be befuddled
by ''absurd and irrational pseudoscientific
assertions." In particular, Justice
Blackmun noted that: "Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof arc the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." 16
Despite the existence of common
ground, there are critical differenceV between the Walstad relevancy approach
and the Daubert approach. Daubert contemplates a far PRUH aFtive screening role
for the trial judge than anything suggested in Walstad. Although the two
cases are not necessarily in cons is tent with
one another, neither arc they identical:
Daubert raises the level of scrutiny contemplated by Walstad's relevancy test to
the fifth power. In addition to the four
WISCONSIN LAWYER

criteria 'discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert also admonished
trial judges to be mindful of other applicable rules (all of which have nearly
identical Wisconsin counterparts).
Rule 703 allows experts to base opinions on inadmissible evidence but only if
LW is of a type that is reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field in reaching
such conclusions. Rule 706 also permits
the courts to appoint their own experts.
Finally, Rule 403 allows the trial judge to
exclude relevant evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed
by other considerations, such as confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.
The Court also suggested that Rule 403
permits the trial judge rnore control over
expert than lay witnesses because
">e]xpert evidence can be both powerful
and quite misleading."
Thus, Daubert portrays a more expansive screening role for the trial judge than
the bare determination of the witness's
qualifications and the relevancy of his or
her testimony as required by Walstad.
Despite its paean to the liberal orientation
of the federal rules, Daubert exudes considerable skepticism about scientific theories and techniques that fall outside the
mainstreams of the expe1ts' disciplines.
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Daubert raises significant
problems and questions

The Walstad approach affords broad admissibility of exSert evidence; it is exceptionally difficult to exclude proffered
expert evidence under its mandate. And
in that sense it affords Wisconsin lawyers
some degree of certainty when preparing
for trial.
Daubert may pose more questions than
it resolves. Although the Court expressed
confidence that trial judges will be able to
navigate the shoals and eddies of science,
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent
pointed out the vagaries inherent in the
criteria posed by the majority, 17 Daubert
is a vote of confidence for trial judges but
leaves them with precious little instruction on how to decide in a particular case
between contending scientists on some
arcane point. Perhaps the key to Daubert
is Justice Blackmun's understated reminder that the proponent of the admissibility of scientific evidence carries the
burden of proof. To put it another way,
the proponent must convince the trial
judge that it is more likely. than not that
the evidence is reliable and fits the facts
of the case. If the judge just does not
know which expert to believe, the evidence must be excluded because the proponent failed to meet the burden of proof.

Equally troubling is that the Daubert
criteria address only scientific knowledge; the Court expressly declined to
discuss how its analysis applied to the
technical or other specialized knowledge
that also is referred to in Rule 702. What
is science? Is there a difference between
science and the other areas of expertise
mentioned in Rule 702? If so, how do we
tell when an expert is a scientist or
nonscientist? For example, is medicine a
science, and if it is what are we to make
of Wisconsin decisions that refer to it as
being an art? 18 The prime virtue of
Walstad is that it offers a test that applies
across the boarJ to all species of experts.
It does not force difficult, and probably
futile, distinctions between science, technology and other specialized knowledge.
Finally, one wonders whether Daubert
is anything more in its effect than the
Frye general acceptance standard by another name. The general acceptance test
may not have survived the federal rules as
the sole criterion of admissibility, but it
nevertheless continues to play a large
role in Daubert. The Court explicitly
stated that general acceptance remains as
an important factor bearing on the trustwmthiness oftl1e scientific theory or technique. And the other three factors ad-

(continued on page 61)
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(from page 13)

vanced by the Court (albeit in a cursory
fashion) all seem to bear on general acceptance as well: l ) has the technique or
theory been tested; 2) has it been published or otherwise subjected to peer review; and 3) is there an established rate of
error or standard of performance? In
short, all three of the e criteria appear to
be alternati ve ways of gaug ing general
acceptance within a scientific community: the Frye test.

What happens now in
Wisconsin?

Daubert undoubtedly will spawn a reexam inatio n of Walstad as lawyers contend
that proffered expert evidence fai ls to
meet the Daubert standard of admissibility. The argument will be that virtually
all of the Federal Rules o f Evidence discussed in Daubert are identical to their
counterparts in the Wisconsin Rules of
Evidence. Such contentions may be furthered by the observation that, in broad
outline, Daubert is cons istent with
Walstad, perhaps representing only a refi nement of the relevancy approach.
Wiscons in state co urts are not, of
course, obligated to adopt Daubert. Alth ough the corresponding state and fed-
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eral evidentiary rules are worded identically and arise from the same model, the
interpretation of the Wisconsin Rules of
Evidence remains a subject of state law.
The Supremacy Clause of the federal
constitution does not force Wisconsin to
j oin the Daubert Court in lockstep.
In all likelihood, Wisconsin will witness a period of uncertainty as the trial
courtS and appellate courtS struggle to
determine whether Walstad survi ves
Daubert. Nor should the focus be kept on
the state courts alone. Daubert poses so
many potential ly troubling questions that
it is likely that the U.S. Supreme Court
may have to revisit the issue to provide
some firmer guidance on such questions
as the applicability of the Court's criteria
to nonscientific evidence.

10
/d. at 2796.
" !d.
12
/d. at 2796-97.
13
/d. at 2797.
" !d.
"Id. at 2797, quoting United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3rd Cir. 1985).
16
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
17
/d. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.G ., dissenting in part).
18
£.g., Beacon Bowl ine. v. Wisconsin Elec. Po wer
Cc., 176 Wis. 2d740, 784, 501 N.W.2d788, 806
( 1993) ("electricity is not an inexact art like
medicine'').
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